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The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts 
of Equity 
Caprice L. Roberts∗ 
Abstract 
A restitution revival is underway.  Restitution and unjust enrichment 
theory, born in the United States, fell out of favor here while surging in 
Commonwealth countries and beyond.  The American Law Institute’s (ALI) 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment streamlines the 
law of unjust enrichment in a language the modern American lawyer can 
understand, but it may encounter unintended problems from the law-equity 
distinction.   
Restitution is often misinterpreted as always equitable given its focus 
on fairness.  This blurs decision making on the constitutional right to a jury 
trial, which "preserves" the right to a jury in federal and state cases for 
"suits at common law" satisfying specified dollar amounts.  Restitution 
originated in law, equity, and sometimes both.  The Restatement notably 
attempts to untangle restitution from the law-equity labels, as well as 
natural justice roots.  It explicitly eschews equity’s irreparable injury 
prerequisite, which historically commanded that no equitable remedy 
would lie if an adequate legal remedy existed. 
Can restitution law resist hearing equity’s call from the grave?  Will it 
avoid the pitfalls of the Supreme Court’s recent injunction cases that return 
to historical, equitable principles and reanimate equity’s irreparable injury 
rule?  Losing anachronistic, procedural remedy barriers is welcome, but 
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the Restatement must be careful to maintain the soul of unjust enrichment, 
which includes flexibility, creativity, justice and morality underpinnings, 
and discretion.  The project’s success depends on streamlining the 
language, unhinging from equity’s arcane procedures, and providing 
guidance for bounded discretion. 
I argue that the ALI’s groundbreaking restitution project will suffer 
because it adopts language of inadequacy and affirms the hierarchy of 
remedies, which prefers legal to equitable remedies.  The Restatement 
notably liberates all restitutionary remedies, including those emanating 
from equity (e.g., constructive trusts), from demonstrating the inadequacy 
of available remedies at law.  This shift moves in the right direction, but 
ultimately the project falls short in a provocative section that authorizes 
disgorgement of profits for opportunistic breaches of contract. 
The disgorgement remedy reallocates the breacher’s wrongful profit to 
the plaintiff if the breach is deliberate and profitable and the contractual 
entitlement inadequately protected.  Disgorgement is an alternate remedy 
to traditional contract damages and, notably, would apply without the 
contractual breach rising to the level of a tort or breach of fiduciary duty.    
The inadequacy requirement may purposefully narrow a bold, and 
perhaps feared, disgorgement remedy, but it creates unnecessary confusion 
by taking the focus away from the breacher’s opportunism and redirecting 
the focus to the adequacy of plaintiff’s compensation.  Even as the 
restitution revival garners traction, inadequacy haunts this important 
restitutionary remedy with equity’s ghosts. 
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I.  Restitution, the Elusive Merger of Law and Equity & Irreparable Injury 
A restitution revival is underway in the United States.1  Scholarly 
interest and cases involving the law of restitution and unjust enrichment are 
increasing in the United States.  International scholars, long intrigued by 
restitution doctrine, are watching American developments with renewed 
interest.  The primary catalyst for the revival is the ALI’s restitution project, 
The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment.2  The 
Restatement’s Reporter, Professor Andrew Kull, the ALI Restitution 
Advisers, and the ALI Members Consultative Group have dedicated fifteen 
years to the project.3  In May 2010, the ALI voted to approve the 
Restatement, which was recently published in July 2011. 
This Article addresses the extent to which equity’s ghosts will haunt 
the revival.  The focus will be on two particular threats:  (i) Will fear of all 
things equity cause total abandonment of unjust enrichment’s roots in 
justice and fairness, and (ii) will equity’s nettlesome procedures undermine 
the launch of an exciting new rule that provides for restitutionary 
disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract?  I answer yes to both 
questions,4 but offer normative approaches for retaining restitution’s 
historical justice roots, while exorcizing the restitutionary disgorgement 
remedy from burdensome equitable prerequisites, including the irreparable 
injury rule and other alternative formulations.5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Part III (providing a full discussion of America’s restitution revival). 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
 3. In full disclosure, my initial interest in and critique of the Restatement (Third) 
project began when I was an outsider to the process.  In 2008, I became an elected member 
of the ALI and had the good fortune to participate in the final waves of restitution revisions 
as a member of the Consultative Group.  
 4. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
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Why does the law-equity divide remain relevant?  The complete 
merger of law and equity remains elusive.  Court systems are no longer 
separated.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged in 1938.6  Almost 
all states have merged law and equity courts.7  Students often fail to 
understand the contemporary relevance of studying equity.  Good-faith 
efforts to teach it are inherently anachronistic.  Many of the core law school 
courses that traditionally covered equity have faded from the curriculum.  
Value remains in appreciating America’s law and equity origins for 
historical reasons alone.  The import of the law-equity distinction, however, 
extends beyond its historical context.  Comprehension is imperative 
because both federal and state constitutions hinge the right to a jury trial on 
the distinction.  The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to trial by jury in certain civil cases:  "In Suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law."8  The Court has not incorporated the 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right to the states by means of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Nevertheless, state constitutions have analogous guarantees.9  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment’s introductory 
clause, "In Suits at common law," to provide a right to trial by jury if the 
right to trial by jury existed at common law.10  If, instead, a judge sitting in 
equity historically handled the matter, then there was no right to a jury trial.  
The judge-jury issue turns on "whether the case before [the court] is one 
that would have been brought at law or in equity in 1791."11  Thus, the law-
equity distinction is dispositive. 
Unfortunately, determining whether the remedy is legal or equitable is 
no simple task.  Many urge the adoption of a functional test that would 
                                                                                                                 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s note. 
 7. For example, Virginia held out until 2006.  See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1.  Delaware 
continues to retain its separate Chancery court system. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). 
 9. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 9.  
State constitutional language usually differs from the federal Seventh Amendment’s, but the 
law-equity distinction remains for states’ constitutional jury trial rights. 
 10. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) 
(finding a right to jury trial in federal copyright actions based on historical English practice). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a. 
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examine the nature and purpose of the remedy.12  Accordingly, if plaintiff, 
for example, seeks compensatory damages, her remedy is legal and triggers 
a jury trial right on seeking the requisite constitutional monetary amount.  
In contrast, if plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the remedy is equitable and 
determined by a judge.  Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence follows a 
more cumbersome, less predictable path.13  In an opinion authored by 
Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court applied a history-plus-remedy test:  the 
nature of the cause of action and the remedy sought.14  In Feltner v. 
Columbia Pictures,15 Justice Thomas decided that the Court could not avoid 
the constitutional jury trial right issue via statutory interpretation of the 
Copyright Act16 and ultimately found that a constitutional right to a jury 
trial existed based on the history of copyright actions and their 
corresponding remedies.17  Thus, students and lawyers have to study and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES & 
MATERIALS 346 (8th ed., 2011) ("There is constant pressure to utilize the remedies test for 
the parties’ right to a jury trial.  That test is more practical and easier to apply."); Chauffeurs 
v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572–80 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (advocating a remedies 
test); see also Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) 
(maintaining that the legal or equitable nature of the remedy sought is the "more important" 
part of the analysis); Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 337 (2d Cir. 2005) (giving more 
weight to the remedies test); C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 
1143 (Cal. 1978) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[T]he basic rule should be that no jury is 
required when plaintiff seeks equitable relief rather than ‘legal’ damages.  That approach 
requires no complex, historical research regarding when and by whom certain rights were 
created.  It also requires less reliance on the anomalies of England’s unique juridical 
history."). 
 13. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 345 (explaining the shift in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the jury trial issue from "a more practical and simpler 
criterion of whether the plaintiff’s demand seeks money" in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 
469, 476–79 (1962), to a three-part test in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)).  The 
three relevant considerations, according to the Court in Ross, were (1) the particular cause of 
action’s history before law and equity merged, (2) the type of relief sought, and (3) the jury’s 
practical ability to resolve the issues.  Id. at 538 n.10.  Later, the Court seemingly abandoned 
Ross’s third factor—the jury’s practical ability—and moved to a two-part analysis of the 
"nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought."  See Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97 ("First, 
we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England 
prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.  Second, we examine the remedy sought 
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature."); see also Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355 
(claiming to "examine both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought," but 
devoting the bulk of analysis to the history of the action). 
 14. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. 
 15. Id. at 340. 
 16. Id. at 345, 352. 
 17. Ironically, the defendant had requested the jury trial, but would have been better 
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research the law-equity distinction as it directly affects a pivotal matter in 
lawsuits—whether the parties will have a right to a jury trial.18 
Merger remains elusive in part because of the jury trial right issue, but 
also due to the remnants of equitable tests that continue to operate as 
prerequisites for access to certain remedies.  The irreparable injury test 
commands that no equitable remedy will flow if adequate legal remedy 
exists.19  This test is oft repeated but rarely understood or applied 
consistently.20  The intractable hold of the irreparable injury rule and the 
rhetoric of inadequacy may muddy the waters for the rollout of the new 
Restatement. 
II.  The Irreparable Injury Rule Is Dead.  Long Live the Irreparable 
Injury Rule. 
Two decades ago, Professor Laycock provocatively declared the death 
of the irreparable injury rule.21  This conclusion rested on his realist 
evaluation of vast remedies caselaw.22  Professor Laycock diligently 
compiled and dissected the cases in a law review article,23 which he 
                                                                                                                 
off with the trial judge’s statutory award of damages ($8.8 million, at $20,000 per 440 
episode violations), id. at 344, rather than what the jury ultimately awarded ($31.68 million, 
at $70,000 multiplied by 440 acts of infringement).  See Columbia Pictures Television v. 
Krypton Broad., Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 
(2002). 
 18. For a useful critique of the law-equity reasoning, see Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, 
The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010).  
 19. See The Changing Limits of Injunctive Relief, 78 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1965) 
("Few legal rubrics can vie in frequency of use with the maxim that equity will not grant 
specific relief—injunction or specific performance of contracts—when there exists any 
adequate remedy at law."); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 266–69 
(describing the history and persistence of the traditional maxim, "the plaintiff’s inadequate 
legal remedy, irreparable injury"). 
 20. See Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1642, 1649 (1992) ("The words irreparable, injury, and inadequate became transmogrified 
into idiom and lost their ordinary meaning in the vernacular."). 
 21. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
687, 692 (1990). 
 22. Id. at 701. 
 23. Id. 
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subsequently expanded into a now-seminal book, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule.24 
He meticulously analyzed hundreds of cases to establish that the 
irreparable injury rule "does not describe what cases do, and it cannot 
account for the results."25  Professor Laycock asserted that the rule 
"highlights the obsolete distinction between law and equity, and 
subordinates more functional schemes for classifying remedies."26  He 
further explained that the rule does not operate as a genuine prerequisite.  
Rather, according to Professor Laycock, "Injunctions are routine, and 
damages are never adequate unless the court wants them to be."27  His 
evidence demonstrated that other reasons and rules actually motivate the 
court decisions.  He admitted, however, that "when courts invoke these 
rules, they often go on to invoke the irreparable injury rule as well."28 
Accordingly, Professor Laycock advised that "[a]nalysis would be 
both simpler and clearer if we abandoned the rhetoric of irreparable injury 
and spoke solely and directly of the real reasons for choosing remedies."29  I 
agree with that prescription, which is no less needed today than it was 
twenty years ago.  Further, Professor Laycock rightly sought "to complete 
the assimilation of equity, and to eliminate the last remnant of the 
conception that equity is subordinate, extraordinary, or unusual."  Not all 
scholars agree with the goal of equalizing the remedial playing field to 
include non-preferential treatment for legal versus equitable remedies.30  
The complete assimilation goal should garner broad support.  Ultimately, 
Professor Laycock urged switching from the law-equity framing to a 
functional analysis:  "[I]s the remedy specific or substitutionary, is it a 
personal command or an impersonal judgment, is it preliminary or 
                                                                                                                 
 24. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991). 
 25. Laycock, supra note 21, at 692. 
 26. Id. at 769. 
 27. Id. at 692. 
 28. Id. at 693. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 20, at 1642 (reviewing Professor Laycock’s 
book).  For two other thoughtful pieces on the meaning of inadequacy and the irreparable 
injury rule before and after Professor Laycock’s obituary of the rule, see Doug Rendleman, 
Irreparability Resurrected?  Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the 
Warren Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2002) and 
Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 346 (1981); see also JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 21 (2006) 
(maintaining that Professor Laycock called time of death too early). 
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permanent?  On the facts of each case, does plaintiff’s preferred remedy 
impose unnecessary costs, or undermine substantive or procedural 
policies?"31 
Overall, Professor Laycock’s proof of the rule’s lack of descriptive or 
predictive value is compelling.  But the irreparable injury rule, along with 
its inadequacy prerequisite, is not dead.  In my opinion, the rule is not alive 
and well but, rather, rattles about like the undead.  Lip service and rhetoric 
persist.  Confusion continues.  Even the Supreme Court is part of the 
problem.  The ALI seeks to be part of the assimilation solution,32 but the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment runs the risk of 
exacerbating the confusion by utilizing an inadequacy inquiry in its new 
rule permitting disgorgement for opportunistic breaches of contract.33  
This temptation for confusion is heightened by the Supreme Court’s 
resurrection of the irreparable injury rule and the inadequacy-of-legal-
remedies test. 
Despite progress on the merger of law and equity, the Supreme 
Court’s recent foray into the law of injunctions represents a move 
backwards.34  In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,35 and its progeny,36 
the Supreme Court reanimated irreparability and inadequacy as hurdles—
two separate hurdles in fact—to the equitable remedy of injunction.37  In 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Laycock, supra note 21, at 693. 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4. 
 33. Id. § 39. 
 34. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s remedies analysis all too often falls short on 
its doctrinal purity.  See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) 
(approving restitutionary disgorgement via a constructive trust remedy without a proper 
doctrinal foundation—operating as if the former CIA agent had breached his fiduciary duty 
when he, in fact, breached only the prepublication clearance clause of his contract); see also 
Caprice L. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 956 n.53 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s 
doctrine-to-remedy analysis in Snepp).  The author will analyze the Court’s remedies 
failures in a forthcoming manuscript. 
 35. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006) (finding 
courts must apply the "traditional four-part test" in deciding whether to grant permanent 
injunctions in patent cases).  
 36. See Monsanto v. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2759 (2010) (finding that 
the lower courts failed to properly apply a four-part test in granting permanent injunction 
against manufacturer of genetically engineered alfalfa during course of federal agency’s 
environmental impact study); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32–33 (2008) 
(overturning preliminary injunction against Navy sonar testing after finding NRDC had 
failed to prove likelihood of irreparable harm to marine mammals). 
 37. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (identifying "irreparable injury" and "inadequacy" as 
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eBay, the Court considered what level of discretion would be appropriate 
for a court to exercise in granting or denying permanent injunctive relief 
for a proven patent violation.38  The district court had denied the 
injunction on the basis of failure to demonstrate irreparable injury:  "[I]t 
concluded that a ‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack 
of commercial activity in practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to 
establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction did not issue."39  The federal appellate court granted the 
permanent injunction as a matter of automatic entitlement based on the 
proven patent violation:  "The court articulated a ‘general rule,’ unique to 
patent disputes, ‘that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement 
and validity have been adjudged.’"40 
Ultimately, the eBay Court found that both the federal district and 
appellate courts erred in failing to "fairly" apply the "four-factor test 
historically employed by courts of equity"—the same test "[o]rdinarily" 
applied by "a federal court considering whether to award permanent relief 
to a prevailing plaintiff."41  In rigid fashion, the Court reset the equitable 
table by cementing the required analysis: 
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking 
a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court 
may grant such relief.  A plaintiff must demonstrate:  (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.42 
Without explicating the quantum of proof required for the four factors, the 
Court simply ruled that both lower courts did not fairly apply the factors 
due to their categorical leanings in opposite directions.  The Court 
reasoned that both lower courts faltered by rigidly conducting the 
equitable analysis:  "Just as the District Court erred in its categorical 
                                                                                                                 
two of the salient factors for consideration). 
 38. Id. at 390. 
 39. Id. at 393 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 
(E.D. Va. 2003)), vacated, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 40. Id. at 393–94 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 41. Id. at 390. 
 42. Id. at 391 (emphasis added). 
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denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical 
grant of such relief."43  Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated the court 
of appeals’ judgment and remanded to the district court so that the district 
court could conduct the four-factor analysis and determine whether a 
permanent injunction should issue in the particular case.44  The Court 
explicitly declined to indicate whether injunctive relief should be 
granted.45 
Most notably, the Court failed to provide any meaningful guidance on 
the interpretation of the irreparable injury factor and the (strangely) separate 
inadequate-legal-remedies factor.  The Court did state the classic 
inadequacy question for the second factor:  "Whether monetary damages 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury."46  It is no wonder that, on 
remand, the federal district court reached its original conclusion, to deny 
injunctive relief on the basis of lack of irreparable injury.47  The district 
court lamented the lack of guidance on the quantum of proof required for 
satisfying the irreparable injury factor.48 
The Supreme Court echoed and extended the remedial lockstep 
hurdles in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council49 and Monsanto v. 
Geertson Seed Farms.50  In Winter, the Court extended the eBay framework 
to a preliminary injunction beyond the intellectual property context.  The 
Winter plaintiffs alleged irreparable environmental harm from Navy sonar 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 394. 
 44. Id.  As it turns out, on remand, the district court went through the motions of the 
four-factor test, but again declined to grant plaintiff an injunction.  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. 
eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590 (E.D. Va. 2007).  The district court limited its 
injunction holding by stating that its "determination that MercExchange fails to establish 
irreparable harm is based upon facts specific to this case and not broad classifications or 
categorical exclusions of certain types of patent holders."  Id. at 570.  The court noted, 
"Although the ‘quantum of evidence’ required to prove irreparable harm remains unclear, 
the potential for loss of market share is insufficient to establish the same; otherwise a 
scenario would never arise where an injunction would not issue."  Id. at 577. 
 45. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 46. Id. at 391. 
 47. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570. 
 48. Id. at 577. 
 49. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (assessing 
propriety of injunctive relief to protect marine wildlife from sonar damage). 
 50. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010) 
(applying the "traditional" four-factor test in overturning trial court’s grant of a permanent 
injunction to remedy a proven National Environmental Policy Act violation) (quoting eBay). 
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testing.51  The Supreme Court found the lower court’s irreparability 
standard in error because the court awarded an injunction based on a 
"possibility," rather than a "likelihood," of irreparable harm.52  Ultimately, 
the Court found the grant of a preliminary injunction in error because of the 
incorrectly applied lower standard for risk of harm, the tip of the balance of 
the equities in the Navy’s favor, and the disservice of the public interest if 
the injunction issued.53 
It was news to remedies and injunctions scholars that the four-factor 
test was the required "traditional," "ordinarily" applied, familiar test; 
scholars "consider the Court’s four-point test to be new."54  Courts have 
historically utilized many balancing techniques in evaluating whether to 
grant equitable relief, including sliding scale tests.55  Scholars and courts 
may now follow the Court’s edict and apply the four-factor test for 
intellectual property injunctions and beyond.  Analyses and criticisms 
abound,56 however, and at least one scholar argues that the four factors 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Winter, 129 U.S. at 371. 
 52. Id. at 375. 
 53. Id. at 381. 
 54. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 273. 
 55. See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 
973, 976 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (declaring that a movant seeking a disfavored injunction 
"must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits and 
with regard to the balance of harms, and may not rely on our modified likelihood-of-success-
on-the-merits standard").  This modified standard requires a movant who makes a weaker 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits to make a strong showing that the balance of 
irreparable injury favors her.  See Winter, 555 U.S. at 33 ("[C]ourts have evaluated claims 
for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ sometimes awarding relief based on a lower 
likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success is very high") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
It is unclear whether sliding scale tests will survive after eBay and Winter.  See id. ("This 
Court has never rejected [a sliding scale] formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.") 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Other courts continue to use a balancing test for the success-on-
the-merits factor.  See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[P]laintiff 
[must] demonstrate[] ‘either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently 
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance 
of the hardships tipping decidedly in the [plaintiff]’s favor.") (emphasis added). 
 56. See generally James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555 (2010); Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable 
Decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597 (2010); J. 
Scott Larson, The Unsettled Aftereffects of eBay and Survey of Its Continued US Litigation 
Impact, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5 (2010); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect:  Tougher 
Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent 
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67 (2009); Tracy Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON 
INTELL. PROP. J. 187 (2008). 
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should be affirmative defenses, with the burden on the defendant to plead 
and prove them.57   
It remains to be seen whether the Court’s reanimation of the 
irreparable injury and inadequacy prerequisites will filter through 
decisionmaking regarding all equitable remedies.  The disgorgement 
remedy for breach of contract runs a peculiar risk because, although the 
Restatement declares the remedy legal, its incorporation of inadequacy 
rhetoric may result in the remedy being hoisted by its own pétard. 
III.  Restitution Revival and the Shackles of Equity 
A.  Restitution in a Global Context 
According to lore, the United States gave birth to the law of unjust 
enrichment.  Credit for this title is owed, at least in part, to the ALI’s first 
restatement project on restitution released in 1937.58  The philosophical 
roots of restitution, however, predate the first restatement contribution.  
Long before the ALI put pen to paper, the law recognized the maxim that 
you cannot reap what another sows.59  Still, the first restatement offered a 
blackletter, compiled bedrock for the development of restitution 
jurisprudence.  With the inaugural restitution work, combined with 
Palmer’s treatise,60 the law of restitution seemed set to blossom.  In the 
decades following 1937, however, the law of restitution and unjust 
enrichment thrived internationally, especially in Commonwealth countries, 
but waned in the United States.61   
Interest in and understanding of restitution has faded in the United 
States.  Commonwealth scholars are engaged in vigorous debate about the 
contours of restitution’s doctrinal scope.62  They are leading the charge for 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. 
MercExchange, 27 REV. LIT. 63 (2008). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)]. 
 59. See A.P. v I.N.S., 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918) (characterizing defendant’s 
unauthorized behavior as an unfair business practice where defendant "is endeavoring to 
reap where it has not sown").  
 60. See generally GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978). 
 61. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (3d ed. 2011); Chaim Saiman, 
Restitution in America: Why the U.S. Refuses to Join in the Global Restitution Party, 28 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100–02 (2008) [hereinafter Saiman, Restitution in America]. 
 62. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 34, at 968–90. 
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the advancement of the modern law of restitution.  Sadly, by comparison, 
the contemporary American lawyer, especially a recent graduate, may have 
little to no comprehension of restitution law.  Modern American lawyers, if 
prompted, may have a dim recollection of their Contracts professor 
introducing the quasi-contract fiction of creating an exchange of promises 
in order to return the parties to the status quo ante63—for example, 
returning money paid for no return consideration64—or awarding quantum 
meruit65 for services rendered under an unenforceable contract.66  American 
courts have continued to issue restitutionary rulings but, all too often, the 
doctrinal logic is utterly absent,67 the terminology misstated,68 and the law 
misconstrued.69  All hope is not lost, however, for American lawyers and 
scholars to revive their interest in restitution law. 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Status quo ante means "to return the parties to the positions they held prior to any 
exchange."  Professor Perillo argues that if restitution has the goal of restoring the status 
quo, it would allow, when the contract is invalid, a restitution remedy for the cost of 
performing or preparing to perform.  Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context 
and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1007 (2011). 
 64. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 314 (N.Y. 1972) 
(permitting boat seller to recover expected profit as a lost volume seller, offset by a return of 
plaintiff’s down payment). 
 65. Quantum meruit means literally "as much as he deserves" or "the reasonable value 
of one’s services." 
 66. See, e.g., Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 1834 WL 1176, at *9 (N.H. 1834). 
 67. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 68. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 493–94 (outlining numerous 
restitution equitable fallacies uttered by courts). 
 69. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255–56  (1993) (describing 
restitution—incompletely—as "a remedy traditionally viewed as ‘equitable’" and 
emphasizing—misleadingly—that "‘equitable relief’ can also refer to those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, 
but not compensatory damages)"); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (lamenting the Court’s muddled ERISA jurisprudence regarding 
federal "equitable" remedies and calling for the Court or Congress to forge a fresh remedial 
structure in order to remedy the colossal misunderstanding and injustices that would 
otherwise flow to plaintiffs under existing caselaw).  But cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–17, 218 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J.) (noting properly the 
difference between legal restitution and equitable restitution, but unfortunately utilizing the 
incorrect term of "damages" for Great-West’s freestanding restitution claim for monetary 
relief); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Serv., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 357 (2006) (describing 
accurately the fiduciary’s claim for a constructive trust or equitable lien as "equitable" 
restitution).  For a thoughtful analysis of Justice Antonin Scalia’s contribution to restitution 
jurisprudence, see generally Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1063 (2003).  Although errors abound on both the federal and state level, there 
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Leading up to and coinciding with the recent Restatement project, 
American scholarly interest in restitution has been on the rise.  Significant 
contributions include the seminal works of Professors Andrew Kull,70 Allan 
Farnsworth,71 Jack Dawson,72 Doug Rendleman,73 Jim Rogers,74 Peter 
Linzer,75 and Mel Eisenberg.76  Other important contributions did not shy 
away from the intricate study that restitution law demands across 
disciplines, such as the work of Professor Candace Kovacic-Fleischer in 
family law,77 Professor Emily Sherwin in varied areas,78 and Professor Sid 
                                                                                                                 
are numerous court opinions that correctly distinguish legal restitution from equitable restitution.  
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the 
distinction and finding a jury trial proper for the legal restitution at issue). 
 70. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement 
of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021 (2001); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 1191 (1995). 
 71. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain?  The Dilemma of the Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985).  Although Professor Farnsworth 
disfavored a robust disgorgement remedy for contract law, his treatment remains seminal.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists the three remedial goals of contract law as the 
expectation, reliance, and restitution interests.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 
(1981).  It notably does not include any reference to a disgorgement interest.  Professor Eisenberg 
maintains that this omission is "plainly deliberate" and tracks Reporter Professor Farnsworth’s 
normative stance against recognition of the disgorgement interest in contract law.  Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 561 (2006). 
 72. John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 56 (1981). 
 73. Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution:  Coordinating Restitution with 
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2011); Doug 
Rendleman, Restating Restitution:  The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 933 (2008); Doug Rendleman, When Is Enrichment Unjust? Restitution Visits an Onyx 
Bathroom, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 991 (2003); Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the 
Subcontractor:  Has Restitution Jumped off Dawson’s Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2001); Doug 
Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement:  Did the Smoke Get 
in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847 (1999). 
 74. James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55 (2007). 
 75. Peter Linzer, Rough Justice:  A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and 
Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695 (2001). 
 76. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 561.  Professor Eisenberg provides detailed case support 
for disgorgement, demonstrates disgorgement’s ability to foster efficiency and promise-keeping 
goals, and compellingly argues "that contract law should and does protect the disgorgement 
interest."  Id. at 562. 
 77. Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L. 
REV. 547 (1986); Candace S. Kovacic, Applying Restitution to Remedy a Discriminatory Denial 
of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743 (1983). 
 78. See generally Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and Creditors, 27 REV. LITIG. 141 
(2008), reprinted in UNJUST ENRICHMENT (G. Radhika, ed. 2008); Emily Sherwin, Love, 
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DeLong regarding disgorgement’s application in practice.79  I have found 
the field fertile ground for scholarship,80 and have also benefitted from 
recent thoughtful treatments by Professors Colleen Murphy,81 Chaim 
Saiman,82 and Eoin O’Dell.83  These works show a resurgence of interest 
and appreciation for the import of restitution law, as well as significant 
disagreement about its interpretation and reach. 
All of this scholarship and the rollout of the new Restatement will 
contribute to the restitution revival in the United States.  As momentum 
continues, the American voice of restitution will regain a place in the global 
debate about the proper application and scope of the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment.   
B.  The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
The ALI approved the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment in May of 201084 and published the work in July 2011.  Law 
                                                                                                                 
Money, and Justice:  Restitution Between Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (2006); 
Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1443 (2004); Emily 
Sherwin, Restitution and Equity:  An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001). 
 79. Sidney W. DeLong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of 
Contract, 22 IND. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
 80. Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in 
Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653 (2010); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary 
Disgorgement as a Moral Compass of Breach of Contract, 77 U. CINN. L. REV. 991 (2009); 
Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective, supra note 34; Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary 
Disgorgement for Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 131 (2008). 
 81. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, What Is Specific about "Specific Restitution"?, 
60 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (2009); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 
SMU L. REV. 1577 (2002). 
 82. See generally Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 993 (2008); Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America, supra note 61; 
Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Study in Contemporary Common Law 
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487 (2007). 
 83. See generally Eoin O’Dell, Spies Like Us? Frank Snepp and George Blake:  
Freedom of Speech and Restitutionary Remedies (Feb. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/26638068/O-Dell-CLP-Paper.  Another interesting 
contribution is Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises:  A 
Disgorgement Theory of Remedies, 52 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1221 (2011), but the 
authors’ omission of the Restatement’s Section 39 is difficult to understand. 
 84. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Current Projects:  Restatement Third, Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&project 
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reform projects are not for the weary.  This particular project occupied the 
unenviable position of updating a body of law not captured in restatement 
blackletter since the first restatement of restitution from 1937.85  The 
second restatement effort never garnered approval.  Now, after ten years of 
labor, critique, and refinement, the Restatement (Third) will make its 
official debut this year.  The Restitution Rollout conference is part of a 
continued effort to introduce the new Restatement to the curiosity and 
candor of the professional world.86 
This Restatement will help revive the American soul of restitution.  It 
has already reengaged a dialogue among American scholars, 
Commonwealth scholars, and beyond.87  The new Restatement will stir 
revival by streamlining a complex body of law into a language the modern 
lawyer can understand.  Ideally, it will serve as a catalyst for a return of 
freestanding law school courses in restitution and unjust enrichment.88 
                                                                                                                 
id=14 ("The final Tentative Draft of this project was approved at the 2010 Annual Meeting, 
subject to the discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative . . . .  Approval cleared 
the way for publication of the official text of this project, which is expected in summer 
2011.") (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST). 
 86. Doug Rendleman first applied this famous phrase to the Restatement as part of our 
Restitution Revival panel description at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 
conference in 2010. 
 87. Numerous panels and conferences in the United States have recently focused on 
restitution and the Restatement (Third), including Washington and Lee University School of 
Law’s Restitution Roundtable and Restitution Rollout Symposium, the American 
Association of Law Schools’ Remedies Section, the Remedies Forum in Aix-en-Provence, 
France, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and the International Contracts 
Conference at the University of Nevada–Las Vegas and Stetson University. 
 88. Although the Restitution course is a staple in Commonwealth jurisdictions, the 
course lost favor in the American curriculum.  Many of the lions in American academia once 
taught Restitution, but the course has all but vanished.  Restitution remains a strong research 
interest of American scholars, but only a couple of law schools have current course offerings 
in restitution.  For example, Professor Kull teaches Restitution at Boston University, and 
Professor Doug Laycock has offered a seminar in restitution at the University of Michigan 
and the University of Virginia.  Many American law professors attempt to cover for the 
course’s absence by teaching a healthy component of unjust enrichment law in the Remedies 
course.  This solution is not ideal, however, for at least two reasons:  (i) Remedies centers 
students’ study on the various avenues to judicial relief rather than the underlying 
substantive law, while incorporating a segment on restitution requires teaching the free-
standing unjust enrichment cause of action in addition to the variety of restitutionary 
remedies that may flow from doctrinal claims in unjust enrichment, contract, tort, 
intellectual property, fiduciary duty, and beyond; and (ii) the typical three-hour Remedies 
course has to do much heavy lifting in order to ensure students gain a capstone experience 
integrating review of vast bodies of underlying doctrine, learn new remedies and limits for 
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The complex history of restitution and its disappearance from the 
American legal landscape require the Restatement to do yeoman’s work.  
The project, like all ALI efforts, must restate the law.  But it also must do 
much more.  The Restatement must reorganize, synthesize, translate, and 
redirect the future of restitution law towards its best aims and with 
appropriate limits. 
First and foremost, the Restatement grounds American law onto one 
center stage.  Simply put, "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense 
of another is subject to liability in restitution."89  Liability may stem from 
one or more underlying substantive causes of action, including, but not 
limited to, contract, tort, fiduciary duty, securities fraud, trademark 
infringement, and unjust enrichment.  Restitution remedies include monies 
returned,90 items returned,91 quantum meruit, accounting for profits, 
disgorgement, and constructive trusts. 
C.  Equity’s Ghosts Haunting Restitution 
The ghosts of equity loom over unjust enrichment and restitution law.  
Equitable ghosts may even threaten the success of the project.  Restitution 
has a sordid past because it has existed remedially as legal, equitable, and 
sometimes both.92  One should not mistakenly assume that restitution 
                                                                                                                 
both public and private remedies, appreciate the continuing import of the law-equity divide, 
and prepare for practice as well as bar exams. 
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1.  Even this simple statement is not without controversy.  
For example, the requirement that the enrichment be "at the expense of another" raises 
concerns because the phrase may confine unjust enrichment recovery to a narrower set of 
cases than courts have permitted.  Doug Rendleman and I hypothetically explore this 
foreseeable, definitional problem: 
Suppose the defendant diverted a benefit which would otherwise have gone to 
the plaintiff.  The court may simply ignore the supposed requirement that the 
defendant’s enrichment must be at the plaintiff’s expense.  Or the court may find 
the intercepting defendant unjustly enriched at the ‘expense of’ the plaintiff and 
order the defendant’s ‘restitution’ of something the plaintiff never had. 
RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 472–73. 
 90. Technically, money "had and received." 
 91. Technically, replevin or "specific restitution." 
 92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(1) ("Liabilities and remedies within the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment may have originated in law, in equity, or in a combination 
of the two."); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 473–95 (discussing the 
law-equity distinction at various points).  
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liability or remedies are inherently equitable.93  Despite repeated 
clarification, the lure of such a misconception is strong.  The very 
foundation of restitution—unjust enrichment—includes the word "unjust," 
which summons forth notions of equitable fairness, equitable discretion, 
and natural justness.  Lord Mansfield famously characterized general 
assumpsit, now called restitution, in an equitable frame: 
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, 
to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the 
equity of the plaintiff’s case, as it were upon a contract ("quasi ex 
contractu," as the Roman law expresses it) . . . . 
In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon 
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice 
and equity to refund the money.94 
These unjustjustice and equitytrappings simultaneously display 
beauty95 while threatening an early demise of the American restitution 
revival.  
Beauty exists in the ability of restitution doctrine to adapt and aid 
cases with unusual fact patterns and unforeseen circumstances.96  The 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a (stating the purpose of § 4(1) "is to warn 
against the common misconception that liabilities or remedies described in terms of ‘unjust 
enrichment’ are necessarily equitable in origin"). 
 94. Moses v. MacFerlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.) 678, 681 (emphasis added); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. b (quoting and discussing Lord Mansfield’s 
announcement in Moses of a restitution theory of liability in equitable terms).  In a mistaken 
improvements case, Joseph Story similarly grounded restitution recovery on natural justice 
and equity:  "‘[J]ure naturae aequum est, neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri 
locupletiorem’ (It is a principle of natural justice and equity, that no one be enriched through 
loss and injury to another)." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. b (describing Story’s 
reliance on this Latin maxim from Roman law and noting that he "was evidently prepared to 
bypass the English authorities altogether" to attain relief through unjust enrichment) (quoting 
Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127 (C.C.D. Me. 1841); see also Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames 
and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 297, 313–16 
(2005) (exploring Story’s influence in grounding the American law of unjust enrichment on 
Roman sources). 
 95. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 12, at 474–77, (exploring the French 
decision, Patureau-Miran C. Boudier, Cass. Req., 15 June 1892 [S.1893.1.28], as translated 
from the decision in JACK BEATSON & ELTJO SCHRANGE, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 39–42); 
id. at 477 (describing the French version of unjust enrichment—the action of de in rem 
verso—as a "supple and elastic doctrine," which holds that "no-one should enrich himself at 
the expense of another without just cause; for equity does not permit it") (emphasis added 
and internal citations omitted). 
 96. Louis E. Wolcher, Intent to Charge for Unsolicited Benefits Conferred in an 
Emergency:  A Case Study in the Meaning of "Unjust" in the Restatement (Third) of 
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doctrine is flexible and may constitute a fail-safe avenue for a remedy.  For 
example, restitution survives statute of frauds problems that bar traditional 
breach of contract actions.97  The law of unjust enrichment and restitution 
has foundational grounding in Aristotelian justice98 and, thus, can achieve 
corrective justice results.  Some scholars celebrate and embrace these 
traditions and features.99  The new Restatement, in contrast, proceeds with 
extreme caution and an explicit voice of departure.  
The Restatement offers at least two critical maneuvers to exorcize 
equity’s ghosts.  It situates the intended path for American restitution within 
the positivist, rather than the natural law, tradition.  The drafters allay 
anticipated American fears:  unjust enrichment and restitution law eschews 
open-ended natural law in favor of grounded, principled, positive law 
doctrinal boundaries.100  Accordingly, the first maneuver notably occurs 
immediately out of the gates in Section 1 to set the proper framing.  This 
explicit dismissal of justice and morality underpinnings garners criticism.101   
I hope the Restatement will foster the restitution revival and 
specifically reignite the soul of restitution in American law.  I fear that a 
complete abandonment of the historical roots of justice represents a 
sanitization of an essential, soulful component of restitution.  Fortunately, 
                                                                                                                 
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911 (2011); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. a ("The chameleon-like qualities of the term "restitution" 
permits its invocation in a variety of circumstances where the legal or equitable nature of a 
given remedy may not be apparent."). 
 97. See Boone v. Coe, 154 S.W. 900, 902 (Ky. 1913) (barring plaintiffs relying 
heavily on an oral agreement and no improvements, but noting the restitution exception for 
other cases). 
 98. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936) (stating that the "‘restitution interest,’ involving a 
combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for 
relief" if the purpose is Aristotelian justice, in which the law’s aim is to maintain "an 
equilibrium of goods among members of society"). 
 99. See, e.g., Wolcher, supra note 96; Peter Linzer & Donna L. Huffman, Unjust 
Impoverishment:  Using Restitution Reasoning in Today’s Mortgage Crisis, 68 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 949 (2011) (arguing that scholars should view restitution law’s ability to address a 
plaintiff’s "unjust impoverishment" as a key characteristic distinguishing it from the other 
principal bodies of law). 
 100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1 cmt. b ("The concern of restitution is not . . . with 
unjust enrichment in any broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to 
what is more appropriately called unjustified enrichment.  Compared to . . . ‘unjust 
enrichment,’ instances of unjustified enrichment are both predictable and objectively 
determined . . . .").  
 101. See generally Linzer & Huffman, supra note 99; Wolcher, supra note 96. 
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these fears may go unrealized due to the gravitational pull of unjust 
enrichment’s history and rhetoric.  Notwithstanding the Restatement’s 
immediate disavowal of unjust enrichment’s historical and moral 
foundation, the strong roots cannot be so easily cut.  Even the Restatement 
offers mixed signals elsewhere throughout its text, showing a visible 
attraction to unjust enrichment’s moral underpinnings.   
For example, the disgorgement of profits remedy for opportunistic 
breach of contract contains multiple moral undertones, speaking of 
"opportunistic" action,102 "conscious wrongdoing,"103 and "conscious taking 
without asking."104  The disgorgement section elevates certain breaches of 
contract from the amoral, or even efficient, frame to the language of unjust 
enrichment, paralleling tort doctrine.  Per the Restatement, the 
disgorgement remedy would operate to disgorge wrongful gains from a 
blameworthy breaching party because it would be unjust to retain such 
opportunistic benefits.105  As I have written elsewhere, the Restatement’s 
rhetorical flourish may have a broader reach than intended106 but, on the 
whole, operationalizing the disgorgement remedy for opportunistic breach 
of contract is a positive development.107  In order for the remedy to be 
successful, it will be critical to establish the appropriate doctrinal 
boundaries, which will include deciding which contractual breach behavior 
is worthy of deterrence via profit-stripping.  With appropriate boundaries, 
keeping a lifeline open to unjust enrichment’s roots will provide a useful 
method for encouraging promise-keeping and deterring opportunism.  This 
path requires careful attention to reasoned discretion with permissible 
reliance on principles of fairness, without fairness automatically triggering 
the equity misconception for all restitution liability and remedies.  
The new Restatement explicitly seeks to escape the shackles of equity 
in another section.  This second maneuver jettisons the equitable irreparable 
injury rule and inadequacy prerequisite:  "A claimant otherwise entitled to a 
remedy for unjust enrichment, including a remedy originating in equity, 
need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at law."108  The 
                                                                                                                 
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39. 
 103. Id. § 39 cmt. b. 
 104. See id. (targeting a breaching party who "takes without asking"). 
 105. Id. § 39 cmt. a.  
 106. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 80, at 1006. 
 107. See id. at 1026 ("But, in the end, a Trojan horse is a bad thing only if you want the 
Greeks to lose."). 
 108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4(2); see also id. § 4 cmt. a (justifying the explicit call for 
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Restatement’s purpose is to correct the misconception that restitution and 
unjust enrichment are necessarily equitable.109  It further seeks to rectify the 
faulty conclusion that leads courts to dismiss restitution claims because an 
adequate remedy exists at law.110  Shedding the inadequacy ghosts may not 
prove to be easy.  The inadequacy of remedies at law is a judicial "slogan" 
that persists despite the disappearance of its original justification.111  Thus, 
the lure of rhetoric and old habits remains.  And what if the restitutionary 
remedy is actually equitable?112  
Accurate law-equity characterization is often elusive.113  Disgorgement 
is no exception.  As a remedy, disgorgement has equitable roots.  
Definitive, consistent categorization, however, is lacking.  Most often, 
courts have designated the disgorgement remedy as equitable.114  This 
determination may hinge on the history of the underlying cause of action, as 
well as the historical tie to the remedy of accounting for profits, a classic 
equitable remedy.  The new Restatement offers a functional clarification for 
determining classification:  "If restitution to the claimant is accomplished 
exclusively by a judgment for money, without resort to any of the ancillary 
                                                                                                                 
erasing the inadequacy prerequisite:  "An argument to the contrary should appear antiquated 
today, but § 4(2) is included to remove any doubt."). 
 109. See id. § 4 cmt. c ("The most widespread error is the assertion that a claim in 
restitution or unjust enrichment is by its nature equitable rather than legal."). 
 110. See id. ("From this false premise [that restitution is naturally equitable] a court 
may conclude . . . that the claim in question may be dismissed because the plaintiff has an 
adequate remedy at law. . . .  [This] conclusion is simply wrong."). 
 111. See id. § 4 cmt. e. (acknowledging that courts continue to recite the inadequacy 
test even though the "old slogan no longer explains what judges do"). The Restatement notes 
the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice that Professor Laycock demonstrated in The 
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule:  courts denying specific performance in contracts cases 
"continue to recite that the test is the adequacy of legal remedies," but "a reason can usually 
be found in independent and identifiable (if unacknowledged) limits to the propriety of the 
remedy in a particular case." Id. 
 112. The Restatement shuns the inadequacy prerequisite even if the restitutionary 
remedy is unquestionably equitable like the constructive trust remedy. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 4 cmt. e.  The final, published Restatement’s comment on the inadequacy test 
declares that "the Restatement does not propose to revive it." Id.  
 113. See Merex, A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 823–26 (2d Cir. 
1994) (explaining that the contract doctrine of promissory estoppel, which postdates Seventh 
Amendment ratification, "eludes classification as either entirely legal or entirely equitable"). 
 114. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998) 
(noting that defendants, who asserted that statutory damages for copyright infringement were 
"clearly equitable," failed to analogize to historical causes of action, "including those actions 
for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable, such as actions for 
disgorgement of improper profits") (emphasis added). 
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remedial devices traditionally available in equity but not at law, the remedy 
is presumptively legal."115 
Historically, disgorgement flowed as a result of an equitable 
"accounting to capture profits and force proof from the defendant."116  In 
this vein, modern disgorgement commonly flows from a fiduciary breach, 
and the disgorgement remedy "forces the fiduciary defendant to disgorge 
gains received from improper use of the plaintiff’s property or 
entitlements."117  The implication of this equitable categorization for breach 
of contract cases without a fiduciary component—like opportunistic breach 
in the Restatement—is unclear.  Disgorgement’s roots in accounting (a 
remedy ancillary to injunctive relief) possess a clear equitable frame:  
"Equity traditionally took jurisdiction to enforce such an accounting 
because there was a substantive equitable duty to account on the part of the 
fiduciary."118  As such, disgorgement arguably operates coercively as an 
order on the defendant like traditional equitable remedies that offer a basis 
for contempt upon disobedience.119   Another rationale supporting an 
equitable classification is that disgorgement, regardless of the nature of the 
underlying cause of action, does not work like traditional contract damages 
that compensate the plaintiff for her loss.120  Rather, disgorgement strips 
defendant’s wrongful gain and, thus, may appear as an equitable personal 
order, commanding specific conduct of the defendant.121  If equitable, 
disgorgement would notably be a matter of judicial discretion. 
Case law also supports an equitable classification for disgorgement, 
but the cases have doctrinal causes of action distinct from breach of 
contract.  A Supreme Court opinion dealing with remedies under the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. d.  This functional approach, although preferred by 
remedies scholars, is not the sole test under the "nature and purpose" framework the 
Supreme Court has adopted.  See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352 (recognizing the "‘general rule’ 
that monetary relief is legal").  
 116. 1 DAN A. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(5), at 
609–10 (2d ed. 1992). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 610–11. 
 119. See id. at 56, 65 ("Some equitable remedies are restitutionary, in money or 
otherwise.  Most often, however, equitable remedies are coercive" and serve as a basis for 
contempt if not followed).  
 120. See id. at 280 (distinguishing disgorgement from traditional legal damages:  "[A] 
recovery [of defendant’s gains] would not be a recovery of damages because it would be 
measured by the defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss"). 
 121. Id. at 65. 
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Emergency Price Control Act explains the equitable nature of 
disgorgement, which scores of cases have cited and applied in a broad array 
of underlying causes of action: 
When the Administrator seeks restitution . . . he asks the Court to act in 
the public interest by restoring the status quo and ordering the return of 
that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.  Such action is 
within the recognized power and within the highest tradition of a court 
of equity.122 
The Supreme Court weighed in again in favor of an equitable label, due to 
disgorgement’s basis in restitution and its incidental connection or 
intertwinement with injunctive relief.123  Other examples of an equity 
classification include disgorgement as a statutory remedy for infringement 
of intellectual property rights124 (although this remedy is unfortunately no 
longer available for patent law).125  Also, a federal district court interpreted 
the Lanham Act to permit plaintiff’s recovery of defendant’s profits 
pursuant to equity principles and, accordingly, denied defendant’s request 
for a jury trial.126  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has also plainly held that "[r]estitution for the disgorgement of 
unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury."127 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946). 
 123. See Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 568–71 (1990) (finding plaintiff union 
members entitled to a jury trial on their suit against union for breach of duty of fair 
representation, despite the many "equitable" traits of the remedy sought).   
 124. See, e.g., Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 
2001) (granting Castrol disgorgement of profits on its unfair competition and false 
advertising (Lanham Act) claims against Pennzoil); see also United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 
438 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Section 332 of the FDCA [granting enforcement 
powers to federal courts] invokes the equity jurisdiction of courts, using the same statutory 
language the Supreme Court construed in Mitchell [v. Robert de Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 
U.S. 288 (1960),] to authorize all traditional equitable remedies.").  The Rx Depot court then 
declared that "[d]isgorgement is a traditional equitable remedy."  Id. 
 125. See generally Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies 
in Patent Law, supra note 80 (demonstrating the faulty Supreme Court logic interpreting the 
elimination of disgorgement in the Patent Act Amendment and making the case for 
restitutionary disgorgement’s reemergence as a valid, alternative remedy for patent 
violations). 
 126. See Castrol, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 344 ("Pennzoil’s argument that it was deprived of 
its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is . . . legally erroneous.  A plain reading of the 
Lanham Act remedy section unqualifiedly weighs against Pennzoil’s interpretation that they 
are entitled to a jury trial on the disgorgement of profits issue. . . .  Furthermore, the 
language of this section makes no mention of a trial by jury."). 
 127. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying 
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Given the likelihood that a plaintiff alleging breach of contract will 
plead alternatively for damages or disgorgement, a court may view the 
question of the law-equity classification (and, thus, the jury trial right) as 
blurred.  One plaintiff in a trademark infringement action unsuccessfully 
attempted this argument, but the failure may have been due to the plaintiff’s 
abandonment of the alternative claim for damages in its amended 
complaint.128  The court’s reasoning for the denial of the blurring theory 
(and thus the jury trial right) demonstrates the strong equitable pulls of 
disgorgement: 
[A] claim for damages seeks, and should be recognized as seeking, relief 
different from a claim for unjust profits.  It is quite possible a plaintiff 
seeking unjust enrichment from a defendant may not have been 
damaged at all by the defendant’s wrongful actions.  In a trademark 
infringement action, for example, a plaintiff may actually have 
benefitted from a defendant’s advertising or promotion of a product 
similar to plaintiff’s product because of increased consumer demand for 
the product.  In such a case, the plaintiff may not have suffered any 
damages; yet the law still entitles him to recover the defendant’s 
wrongful profits.  Thus, because a claim for profits seeks relief 
recognized by the Seventh Amendment as fundamentally different from a 
claim for damages, the cases relied upon by American Cyanamid—
involving claims for both damages and unjust profits—cannot be 
interpreted as blurring the two claims and rendering legal an otherwise 
purely equitable claim for profits. 
The distinction between American Cyanamid’s claims for damages and 
profits is not simply semantic.  What does American Cyanamid give up 
by abandoning its claim for damages—the right to prove an injury for 
which, if infringement is proved, the law allows recovery of damages[?]  
Although American Cyanamid seeks money, it does not seek money for 
its injury; rather, it seeks the amount by which Sterling Drug was 
enriched from infringing on American Cyanamid’s trademark. In 
substance, American Cyanamid seeks a determination whether Sterling 
Drug was enriched because of an infringement and, if so, an order 
requiring restitution of such money from Sterling Drug to American 
Cyanamid. These demands are equitable in nature.  Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiff’s request for disgorgement of profits because (1) plaintiff had elected damages at 
law by requesting a jury, (2) the district court submitted three claims—breach of a 
confidential relationship, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation—to 
the jury, and (3) the jury awarded damages for each). 
 128. See Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784, 785, 789 (D.N.J. 
1986) (considering a jury trial but ultimately denying the right given plaintiff’s pursuit of 
restitutionary disgorgement). 
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determination of whether there is a right to a jury trial in this case is not 
decided merely on the choice of the words or phrasing used in the 
pleadings.129 
Scholars have also recognized the difficulty of definitively labeling 
disgorgement as either legal or equitable.130  Further, all too often, courts 
attach the equity label in a conclusory fashion, but not without scholarly 
criticism.131  Unfortunately, the weight of such scholarly treatments is 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).  The court also explores the import of the Supreme 
Court’s remarks in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), about distinguishing 
between a bona fide prayer for relief and a semantic maneuver to gain or avoid a jury trial.  
Sterling Drug, 649 F. Supp. at 787.  Notably, the Court in Dairy Queen reasoned that 
plaintiff’s claim for an accounting of profits was, in essence, a legal claim for damages:  
We find it unnecessary to resolve this ambiguity in the respondents’ complaint 
because we think it plain that their claim for a money judgment is a claim 
wholly legal in its nature however the complaint is construed.  The respondents’ 
contention that this money claim is "purely equitable" is based primarily upon 
the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an "accounting," rather than in 
terms of an action for "debt" or "damages."  But the constitutional right to trial 
by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the 
pleadings. 
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477–78 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has re-emphasized 
the import of the nature of the relief actually sought versus creative characterization to gain 
access to available remedies under ERISA.  See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220 (2002) (affirming dismissal of suit under Section 502 of the 
ERISA upon finding that plaintiffs were, in reality, seeking legal damages rather than an 
equitable remedy authorized by the statute).  For additional cases after Great-West that place 
emphasis on the real relief sought over cloaking and faux-garb on remedy claims, see Coan 
v. Kaufman, 333 F. Supp. 2d 14, 25 (D. Conn. 2004); Scholastic Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F. 
Supp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Conn. 2005); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., No. 96-3587, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29261, at *36 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 130. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LANGER, JOHN T. MORGAN & DAVID BELT, 12 CONN. PRAC., 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES § 6.9 (1st ed. 2003) ("The question of whether the remedy of 
disgorgement is legal or equitable is complex.  In general, restitution for unjust enrichment 
may be awarded in an action at law.").  The treatise surveys a number of cases under the 
FTC Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.) and California’s Unfair Competition Law, which it places 
in three conflicting categories:  cases that (1) authorized disgorgement as an available legal 
remedy, (2) permitted disgorgement only as ancillary equitable relief, or (3) denied as 
unavailable the remedy of nonrestitutionary disgorgement.  Id. (emphasis added).   
 131. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence:  Implied Jurisdiction and 
Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 48 
(2007) (criticizing a lower court for "ignor[ing] the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion 
that, like restitution, disgorgement can be either a remedy at law or in equity").  Roach notes, 
"In essence, the Northern District of Illinois identified three different types of remedies:  
restitution in equity, restitution at law and disgorgement.  Rather than define the exact nature 
of disgorgement and identify the key characteristics of disgorgement that qualify it as a 
remedy in equity, the opinion attaches a label and effectively assumes away the issue."  The 
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unclear given that the underlying cases involve statutory interpretation 
unlike a claim of disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract. 
Contracts case law exists in which disgorgement-like remedies are 
awarded,132 but the cases shed little, if any, light on the proper treatment of 
the remedy.  Contracts courts have consistently failed to either characterize 
the remedy as disgorgement,133 rely on restitution and unjust enrichment 
doctrine, or consider the jury trial right issue.  For example, courts speak in 
terms of expectancy, but when left without an appropriate market measure, 
they use the profit earned by the breaching party as the measure, which 
effectuates a disgorgement.134   Accordingly, the Restatement offers the 
disgorgement section as a new rule for disgorging profits from 
opportunistic breach of contract based on unjust enrichment principles.  If 
the overt combination of breach of contract and disgorgement is new, then 
historical analysis provides little to no guidance.  
A pure, functional, remedial analysis likely supports a finding that the 
shifting of promisor’s gain to the promisee is a legal money judgment that 
ought to trigger the parties’ jury-trial right.  The Restatement comments 
argue for this interpretation and assert that disgorgement does not operate 
on the promisor; it does not command any act on the promisor’s part.135  
Rather, disgorgement will resemble a damage remedy that is enforceable 
via traditional damage routes like writs of execution.  Further, the 
Restatement urges throughout that the restitutionary disgorgement remedy 
                                                                                                                 
lower court opinion that failed to heed the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion is SEC v. 
Buntrock, No. 02C2180, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at *7–9 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2004) 
(concluding that "generic" disgorgement is an equitable remedy).  The Seventh Circuit 
opinion handed down after Great-West is SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 
2002) ("Disgorgement is another name for restitution . . .  and restitution, as we have noted 
in several non-SEC cases, is both a legal and an equitable remedy."); see also George P. 
Roach, Counter-Restitution For Monetary Remedies in Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1271 (2011). 
 132. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest In Contract Law, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 559, 578–97 (2006) (discussing cases acknowledging a disgorgement interest in 
remedying breach of contract). 
 133. See Farnsworth, supra note 71, at 1371 ("[C]ourts have often applied traditional 
damage rules in such a way as to favor disgorgement.  They have done this first, by looking 
to market price rather than the buyer’s actual cover price and, second, by looking to the 
seller’s actual resale price as evidence of market price . . . ."). 
 134. Id.; see also Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1956) (calculating plaintiff 
salon owner’s damages as the difference between stylist’s salary before and after stylist 
breached contract by joining new hair salon at higher pay). 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. c. 
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be viewed as legal rather than equitable.  Given the historical, equitable 
roots of disgorgement in other substantive areas, however, courts and 
lawyers may continue to view disgorgement as ancillary to equitable 
remedies, such as accounting for profits.  The Restatement appears to favor 
"legal" characterization (with the accompanying jury trial right) so that the 
disgorgement remedy will avoid the fears of unbounded judicial 
discretionPalmtree Justice via the "Chancellor’s clumsy foot."136  In 
addition, defendants may well fear that juries will seize on disgorgement to 
deter perceived opportunism and honor promise-keeping.  The drafters hope 
the Restatement’s cabining of the disgorgement rule will bound jury 
decision making.137 
If disgorgement for opportunistic breach of contract is equitable, 
should courts require a plaintiff to establish inadequacy to attain a 
disgorgement remedy?  The Restatement asserts "no" in its explicit 
rejection of the inadequacy prerequisite.138  It declares that raising this 
anachronistic barrier for any unjust enrichment claim is fundamentally 
flawed:  "Courts too often recite that one of the requirements of a claim 
based on unjust enrichment is absence of an adequate legal remedy.  This 
spurious proposition rests on an obvious fallacy, and it obscures what courts 
are actually doing when they invoke it."139  Thus, even if the restitutionary 
remedy is equitable, courts should not bar remedial access based on the 
availability of legal remedies.  The pre-publication draft Restatement 
attempted to further barricade disgorgement from equity’s ghosts by 
declaring it legal.140  The final, published version of the Restatement is 
silent on the classification of disgorgement.   
                                                                                                                 
 136. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Deleting "Palmtree Justice" does not change anything.  See Sarah Worthington, 
Majority Rule:  When Can Minorities Cry Foul?, 40 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 11) ("[T]he House of Lords decided in broad terms that unfettered discretion 
is something that the law does not admit.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. f ("The cumulative requirements of § 39 will 
exclude the great majority of contractual defaults.").  The Comment elaborates by noting that 
"[t]he scope of [§ 39] is further restricted by the requirement that breach be deliberate—
thereby excluding cases in which breach results from the defendant’s inadvertence, 
negligence, or unsuccessful attempt at performance."  Id. 
 138. Id. § 4(2). 
 139. Id. § 4 cmt. e. 
 140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 4 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 7, 2010) (warning that 
it would be a grave mistake to regard the newly formulated rule of disgorgement in § 39 as 
"equitable"). 
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If courts treat disgorgement as legal, it is plain that the Restatement 
commands rejection of the inadequacy prerequisite for all unjust 
enrichment remedies, including disgorgement.141  Well, it is plain in 
Section 4(2).  Plain, at least, in the main text, but the clarity fades in the 
Restatement’s comments:  "Section 4(2) is stated in broad terms, without 
reference to Section 39, in order to convey as clearly as possible a general 
truth about the modern law of restitution and unjust enrichment; but 
Section 4(2) may be qualified by reference to Section 39(1), to the extent of 
any perceived inconsistency."142  Unfortunately, the operational section for 
the remedy of disgorgement for opportunistic breach, Section 39, is also 
unnecessarily confusing on this score.  The blackletter portion dangerously 
resurrects remnants of equitable rhetoric: 
If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting 
promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate 
protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promisee has a 
claim to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of 
breach.143 
It further reiterates disgorgement’s distinction from damage remedies:  
"Restitution by the rule of this section is an alternative to a remedy in 
damages."144  The comments, notably, draw a parallel between 
disgorgement and the equitable remedy of specific performance.145  Despite 
the italicized language in both quotes, the Restatement assures that 
disgorgement for opportunistic breach is legal and not an extraordinary 
equitable remedy146 and that plaintiffs seeking disgorgement need not 
overcome an inadequacy-of-legal-remedies hurdle.   
Is the Restatement speaking out of both sides of its mouth?  Did 
drafting compromises lead to mixed messages?  The next section analyzes 
how lawyers and judges may decipher such competing signals.  It also 
urges a normative approach that will help exorcize equity’s ghosts, 
eliminate false remedial hierarchies, and focus the debate on the appropriate 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)§ 4(2) (liberating all unjust enrichment remedies from 
showing the inadequacy of available remedies at law).  
 142. Id. § 4 cmt. e. 
 143. Id. § 39(1) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. § 39 cmt. c.  
 146. See id. ("Disgorgement is a monetary remedy enforceable only against defendant’s 
property, not by attempting to coerce the defendant’s conduct, and the value of the judgment 
is the same for each side.").  
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substantive limits of restitutionary disgorgement for opportunistic breach of 
contract. 
IV.  Inadequacy’s Inadequacy for Restitution’s Contractual Disgorgement 
Remedy  
A.  Inadequacy by Any Other Name Does Not Smell So Sweet 
Restitution’s contractual disgorgement remedy for opportunistic 
breach of contract ensnares disgorgement in the language of equity by 
resurrecting inadequacy with an "inadequate protection" analysis.  With one 
hand, the Restatement eschews the inadequacy-of-legal-remedies test, but 
with the other it endorses a hurdle of "inadequate protection" of damage 
remedies for access to the alternate remedy of disgorgement.  The 
Restatement recognizes the potential for misinterpretation: 
The rule of § 39 . . . allowing disgorgement of profits realized by an 
opportunistic breach of contract, inquires whether "the available damage 
remedy affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual 
entitlement. . . . " By inquiring whether "the available damage remedy 
affords inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement," 
the rule of § 39 echoes the functional question at the heart of the 
traditional inquiry into adequacy of legal remedies.147 
The Restatement admits the apparent inconsistency between 
disgorgement’s inadequate protection requirement and the Restatement’s 
abandonment of the inadequacy test for unjust enrichment remedies.148  The 
operational disgorgement section reiterates the problematic resemblance to 
equity’s inadequacy of legal remedies test and again warns against viewing 
the new disgorgement rule as an equitable remedy subject to anachronistic 
jurisdictional hurdles of equity.149  The Restatement reiterates its intent to 
shed the inadequacy prerequisite for all remedies based on unjust 
enrichment:  "Properly interpreted, there is no conflict between the 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. § 4 cmt. e, reporter’s note e.  
 148. Id. § 4 reporter’s note e ("The final paragraph of Comment E acknowledges a 
possible inconsistency between §§ 4(2) and 39(1)."). 
 149. Id. § 39 cmt. c ("Although [this] inquiry . . . resembles the traditional threshold test 
for equitable jurisdiction, stated in terms of ‘adequacy of remedy at law,’ it would be 
erroneous and anachronistic to regard this newly-formulated rule as a species of equitable 
relief, or to limit its availability by reference to obsolete jurisdictional boundaries."). 
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requirements of § 39 and the general proposition of § 4(2)."150  The problem 
lies in whether lawyers and judges will properly interpret the "inadequate 
protection" language shrouding this new disgorgement remedy for 
opportunistic breach. 
Faith in proper interpretation is difficult to muster.  Proper 
interpretation is unlikely given the basic misperceptions of unjust 
enrichment and the lasting pull of equitable framing of unjust enrichment 
and continuing rhetorical force of the inadequacy of legal remedies 
prerequisite.  The commentary in the Restatement may do little to ensure 
proper interpretation due to its conclusory assertions in an already muddled 
landscape.   
The Restatement’s blackletter aims to secure proper interpretation 
through explicit construction of inadequate protection.  It defines when 
inadequate protection exists: 
A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the promisee’s 
contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not 
permit the promisee to acquire the full equivalent to the promised 
performance in a substitute transaction.151 
Will this section sufficiently distinguish inadequate protection from the 
inadequacy of legal remedies prerequisite?  I have critiqued this section 
elsewhere, based on the promisee’s likely sense of inadequate protection 
versus a court’s interpretation of full equivalent,152 such as the 
Restatement’s nonconforming widget illustration.153 
In the widget illustration, Seller confronts an unexpected price increase 
in manufacturing and then deliberately delivers nonconforming widgets and 
profits by saving $50,000, but Buyer’s remedy will be limited to "an 
ordinary damage remedy" of $10,000 (the difference in value between the 
promised widgets and the delivered nonconforming widgets) rather than a 
disgorgement of the $50,000.154   Disgorgement, per the illustration, is 
unavailable because "there is no reason to conclude that Buyer’s entitlement 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. § 39 cmt. c (emphasis added).  
 151. Id. § 39(2). 
 152. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement, supra note 80, at 1021–24 (analyzing 
Restatement illustration formerly numbered 13 (now 16)). 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 illus. 16, reporter’s note i (basing the illustration 
on "a hypothetical example designed to emphasize the point that a breach of contract may be 
deliberate and profitable (not to mention ‘efficient’) without being opportunistic"). 
 154. Id. § 39 cmt. i, illus. 16. 
THE RESTITUTION REVIVAL 1057 
is inadequately protected by an ordinary damage remedy."155   The 
illustration asserts that "[d]amages measured by difference in value give 
Buyer ‘a full equivalent to the promised performance,’ and the case is one 
in which specific performance would have been denied."156   
Given the underlying subject matter of the illustrationgoods, 
widgetscommodification into money damages is palatable, if not 
expected.  Yet, what if Buyer alleges inadequate protection because the 
difference in value measure will not yield the full equivalent to the 
promised performance in fact?  Is the inadequate protection analysis distinct 
from asking whether an adequate legal remedy exists?  Buyer, who may 
desire disgorgement or specific performance, is effectively denied such a 
remedy because Buyer must accept that a difference-in-value measure will 
be adequate.  The difference-in-value measure may be a form of an 
expectancy measure,157 but it does not ensure Buyer’s contractual 
entitlement.   
My critique does not require that we provide Buyer the disgorgement 
remedy, which may constitute an after-the-fact, monetized form of specific 
performance.  Rather, the challenge is whether the inadequate protection 
requirement will likely drag lawyers and courts into anachronistic 
inadequacy-of-legal-damages analysis and unnecessarily reinforce remedial 
hierarchies.  If disgorgement is inappropriate as a remedy for the widget 
Buyer in the illustration, we should center the debate on substantive reasons 
for denying the remedy, such as in cases in which the breaching behavior 
does not rise to the level of wrongfulness we wish to deter.158  For example, 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Expectancy can be under-compensatory.  See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That 
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage 
Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 405 (1990) (critiquing the judicial trend of awarding punitive 
damages for breach of contract but not enforcing liquidated damages clauses or granting 
specific performance as unfaithful to contracting parties’ expectation interest); Alan 
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 305 (1979) (arguing 
specific performance should be available on request because it would better meet the goals 
of compensation and expectancy).  
 158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 39 cmt. i ("Facts along these lines are a staple of 
commentators’ accounts of circumstances in which a party’s intentional breach of contract 
should not be regarded as a wrong.").  The Restatement cites Professor Laycock regarding 
parallel examples in which courts denied specific performance on the basis of 
disproportionate hardship to the promisor.  Id. (citing LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 175–76 (1991)).  Although Professor Laycock’s work effectively 
shows that disproportionate hardship, not the irreparable injury rule, is the real reason that 
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Seller’s breach may be deliberate and profitable but "committed only to 
avert a larger loss."159  The touchstones for line drawing on the 
restitutionary disgorgement remedy should be the breaching party’s 
behavior, the need to promote promise keeping, and the interest in deterring 
the particular type of breach in question.   
To the extent that inadequate protection exists, it is not with respect to 
the classic monetary remedy but, rather, it exists when a stronger party took 
advantage of a less sophisticated party, at possibly two turns:  (1) the 
bargaining phase that left the less sophisticated party without a liquidated 
damage clause, and (2) the pre-breach phase in which the promisor did not 
renegotiate with Buyer but, instead, consciously took without asking.  It is 
for these reasons that a disgorgement remedy should be available.  Yet, 
given the newness of the rule of disgorgement for opportunistic breach in 
America, it may be wise to cabin disgorgement to certain cases rather than 
allowing it to be accessible on the non-breaching party’s prerogative.  The 
lines of limitation should focus on which breaches are worthy of deterrence 
(i.e., which breaches are opportunistic). 
B.  A Normative Approach for Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Opportunistic Breach 
The American restitution revival is an exciting time for restitution 
scholars worldwide.  It reengages our contribution to the global dialogue on 
the appropriate boundaries of an artful, powerful body of unjust enrichment 
law and remedies.  In order for the new Restatement of restitution to make 
the most splash, it is essential that its promise not be lost in clunky, 
unfamiliar vernacular.  One of the Restatement’s primary values is the 
modernization and clarification of the language of the doctrine and its 
remedies.  The more vexing problem may well prove to be the shackles of 
equity.  Recognizing the pitfalls, the drafters sought to eradicate all 
references to the law-equity divide from the project.160  The drafters 
                                                                                                                 
courts deny specific performance, courts often conduct an irreparable injury analysis under a 
rubric in which the promisee must show entitlement to specific performance—what the 
courts still deem an extraordinary remedy—in the face of the preferred expectancy measure.  
Fortunately, the disproportionate hardship focus at least concentrates attention on the 
breaching party, which more naturally comports with the restitutionary disgorgement 
remedy. 
 159. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118–19 (4th ed. 1992). 
 160. Andrew Kull, Remarks at the Restitution Rollout Symposium (Feb. 25, 2011), 
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succeeded with this endeavor with minor exceptions, such as the 
constructive trust remedy, which has equitable roots that simply run too 
deep.161 
In the overarching frame, the Restatement may bend too dramatically in 
its abandonment of equitable principlesall things flexible, discretionary, 
and rooted in natural justice.  The American law of restitution need not adopt 
an anachronistic law-equity divide, but we would be wise to retain the beauty 
and flexibility of the underlying doctrine.  At its core, restitution doctrine 
requires that one be unjustly enriched.  "Unjustly" means that either a judge 
(if the equitable historical characterization sticks) or a jury (if the legal 
conception prevails) must determine whether it is "unjust" for a breaching 
party to retain the benefits without paying the non-breaching party.  That 
determination inherently calls for a sense of justice, of right and wrong, in 
consideration of the whole context.  Accordingly, the introductory 
definitional provision of the Restatement should not be interpreted as devoid 
of justice considerations.  Rather, interpretation requires considerations of 
justice, but those considerations should be principled and evaluated with the 
helpful guidance of the whole body of the Restatement with all of its 
blackletter, illustrations, and commentary on the categories of wrongdoing 
that restitution law seeks to deter. 
With respect to disgorgement, the Restatement eschews the equity 
rubric with one breath, while utilizing an inadequate protection requirement 
that may raise equity’s ghosts in the minds of interpreters.  Given that it is too 
late for a substantive change to the text of the disgorgement rule, courts and 
scholars would be wise to focus the analysis on the appropriate level of 
conscious wrongdoing, coupled with profiting, to warrant application of the 
disgorgement remedy.  In the American contract law tradition, the debate 
regarding the proper scope of disgorgement liability should encompass 
recognition of contract law’s varied, and sometimes competing, goals:  
predictability, certainty, the flow of the wheels of commerce, efficiency, 
flexibility, and promise keeping.  Restitution law adds the deterrence element 
and encourages renegotiation for breaches of contract that are at the ethical 
margins, rather than garden-variety, tolerable breaches.  Drawing this line 
will be difficult, but it must be done.  I maintain that we should engage in the 
substantive line drawing process rather than focus on the promisee’s ability to 
establish that legal remedies will adequately protect her contractual 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://law.wlu.edu/news/archivemultimedia.asp. 
 161. Id. 
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entitlement.  American law should follow the Commonwealth and other 
countries towards less rigidity on the hierarchy of a promisee’s access to 
remedies and focus more on whether access to supercompensatory remedies, 
like disgorgement, should be available as a tool to encourage promise 
keeping and deter conscious taking without asking. 
To the extent that disgorgement cannot shake an equitable remedy 
characterization, judges should use bounded discretion.  They should base 
recovery in disgorgement on the case illustrations of the Restatement.  
Although the Restatement cannot anticipate the creative opportunism of 
future breaching parties, judges can study the collection of restatement cases 
across disciplines to discern when the breaching behavior rises to the level of 
wrongfulness justifying stripping gains and reallocating those gains to the 
nonbreaching party.  If the Restatement conception of disgorgement as legal 
prevails, judges should exercise their gatekeeping functions on the issues of 
deliberateness and profitability, and juries should award disgorgement if they 
are convinced that plaintiff’s proof of opportunism warrants restitutionary 
recovery. 
V.  Keep on Merging and Embrace Disgorgement Remedy for Opportunistic 
Breach 
America’s restitution revival should embrace the justice and fairness 
roots of unjust enrichment.  At the same time, the restitution revival must 
carefully exorcize equity’s ghosts in order to avoid the further 
misconceptions of the doctrine and faulty conclusions causing unnecessary 
denials of unjust enrichment claims and remedies.  The Restatement project 
admirably streamlines the language of unjust enrichment but, at times, strains 
to cabin the reach of new, provocative sections like disgorgement.  Efforts to 
compromise and allay fears may result in unfortunate entanglement with 
equity’s ghosts, especially the irreparable injury rule.   
The wise approach is to avoid lingering in the purgatory of equity’s 
remnants.  Instead:  "When the ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice 
clanking their medieval chains the proper course of the judges is to pass 
through them undeterred."162  As lawyers, judges, and scholars offer 
                                                                                                                 
 162. United Australia v. Barclays Bank, [1941] A.C. 28–29 (H.L.) (lamenting legal 
restitution’s historical path from the contract doctrine of assumpsit, which, over time, 
required legal fictions that implied a "debt" and a "promise to repay").  Lord Atkin 
remarked, "These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet requirements 
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important early interpretations of disgorgement’s boundaries in American 
law, let the focus be on the set of breaches warranting deterrence and 
justifying the promotion of promise keeping and prevention of unjust 
enrichment. 
                                                                                                                 
of the law as to forms of action which have now disappeared should not in these days be 
allowed to affect actual rights."  Id. 

